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 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going?”
— Paul Gaughin
Who are we? Several years after commencing my career- long 
comparison of indigenous peoples previously partitioned into 
French and British colonies, a psychologically astute colleague- 
friend made me realize that, at heart, my subject matter was 
identity. Now, identity is a topic that transcends several intel-
lectual disciplines and paradigms. It is also a very personal 
matter— which is why I had ostensibly camoufl aged my per-
sonal quest for it by conducting fi eldwork in remote locales and 
among exotic peoples throughout the developing world. And 
I did so as a political scientist! That tension between scholarly 
research agenda and subconscious preoccupation was ultimately 
resolved (at least on paper) with the publication of my Zion in 
the Desert, a study of American Jewish baby boomers who, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, opted to become Israeli kibbutzniks in 
the Negev Desert.
But every one of us has reason to ponder the randomness of 
being bequeathed a particular society, culture, and nation. Rel-
atively few on this planet enjoy the luck of acquiring at birth 
the nationality and support system of a developed, high- income 
nation. That existential puzzle has nagged at me ever since a 
two- year Peace Corps stint revealed both the unmerited luck 
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of having been born citizen of a “developed country” and the 
corresponding (and humbling) dignity, solidarity, and tenac-
ity of the impoverished majority otherwise allotted the “third 
world.” For allowing me to share those refl ections in extenso, in 
My African Horse Problem, I acknowledge University of Mas-
sachusetts Press editor Bruce Wilcox.
Three questions undergird the present book: (1) How did dis-
crete indigenous groups (e.g., Melanesian, Hausa, Tamil, Lao), 
respond, subvert, and adjust to the respective British and French 
colonial projects superimposed onto their society and culture? 
(2) In what ways (political, linguistic, economic) have their emer-
gent postcolonial states differed as a consequence of their pre-
vious colonial imprints? (3) To what extent are contemporary 
world processes, particularly globalization and development, 
mediated on the national level by institutional and cultural pat-
terns established during the colonial and early postcolonial eras?
To address these questions, I have conducted grassroots 
research in all regions of the world that have experienced the 
close- quartered impact of Anglo vs. French colonialism: West 
Africa, the West Indies, South and Southeast Asia, the South 
Pacifi c, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. In the Mid-
dle East— where colonial/mandate Anglo- French borders were 
those of Iraq and Jordan with Syria, and between Palestine 
and Lebanon— my fi rsthand research into colonial legacies has 
been restricted to Palestinian and Israeli Francophones (Miles 
1995b; Miles and Sheffer 1998). Since that research is not meth-
odologically comparable to the other cases, I do not include it 
in this book.
For all but one of the cases that I do present here, follow-
ing local language training I spent a minimum of seven months 
in the fi eld. While my level of fl uency has never been the same 
across all the relevant languages, in the process I have become 
quite comfortable in French, Hausa, and Bislama, and pass-
ably conversational in Creole/Kreol, Hebrew, and (at the time) 
Tamil. Although my fi rst offi cially sponsored research began 
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in 1982 in Martinique, my appetite for fi eldwork was whet-
ted by a 1976 undergraduate foray to rural Québec under the 
supervision of Vassar College geography professor Harvey Flad, 
and as assistant to the late anthropologist Horace Miner, to 
northern Nigeria in 1980. My two years (1977– 79) as a Peace 
Corps volunteer in a town in Niger near the border with Nige-
ria were also formative in honing a sensitivity to postcolonial 
Francophone- Anglophone differences. However one dates my 
status as a grassroots researcher into Anglo- French postcolo-
nialism, it now spans over a quarter of a century.
For fear of undue academic scrutiny, I hesitate to reveal which 
one of the chapters is based on fi eldwork falling below my stan-
dard threshold of at least half a year in the fi eld and reason-
able familiarity with the local language. But the truth is that I 
know only a few words of Burmese and Lao and that my three 
research trips to Myanmar and Laos were each of only a few 
weeks’ duration. (A previous visit to Thailand had brought me— 
thanks to Kwanchewan and Witoon Buadaeng— to the border 
with Burma.) Accordingly, except for the few Francophones I 
located in Laos, in Southeast Asia I depended heavily on trans-
lators. In instances where I interviewed hill peoples who did not 
know their country’s offi cial language, I had to work through 
double layers of translation. The ensuing loss in direct access 
to informants was frustrating. I trust that the excellent second-
ary sources upon which I draw for that chapter compensate in 
some measure for my regional and linguistic lack of expertise 
there. Two of the foremost experts on Myanmar and Laos, Pro-
fessor David Steinberg and Dr. Martin Stuart- Fox, respectively, 
graciously agreed to make improvements on my draft chapter.
I owe debts to numerous other scholars. Colleague- landsmen 
who have encouraged me in my cross- regional research include 
Professors Bob Charlick, Larry Diamond, Michael Horowitz, 
and Lenny Markovitz; Leo Villalón keeps me on my Franco-
phone Africanist toes. Professor Tony Asiwaju of the University 
of Lagos has kept me anchored to the borderline perspective 
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throughout my comparative research; Professor John Paden has 
kept me grounded in Nigeria throughout my supra- African per-
egrinations. So has Dr. Binta Audu. The “psychologically astute 
colleague- friend” to whom I referred earlier is David Roche-
fort. It was Dr. Larry Diamond, above all, who most explicitly 
put it to me, during a beach walk in Mauritius in 1997, that I 
ought to begin integrating all my separate fi eldwork cases into a 
synthetic whole. I resisted— for about a decade. Along the way 
I benefi ted from continuous intellectual exchange, encourage-
ment, and hospitality from former diplomat Jeffrey Liteman and 
Dr. Andy Cook. Professor Philip Boucher, former president of 
the French Colonial Historical Society, directed me to the Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press on account of its long- standing high- 
quality scholarly imprints on France’s former colonies.
Various institutions have made this work possible. For travel 
funding, but more important, the precious grant of time off for 
research, I thank Northeastern University. Based at Northeastern 
is Terry Beadle, illustrator and map maker for this book, whose 
professional expertise, commitment, and camaraderie have been 
a boon to my entire career as scholar, author, and lecturer. Stu-
dents Elvira Josifi  and Heather Peltier applied themselves to root-
ing out bibliographic oversights in the manuscript. For the initial 
gift of two years in an African borderland community, I thank 
the Peace Corps. The Shell International Studies Research pro-
gram, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the American 
Institute of Indian Studies, the American Philosophical Society, 
the Fulbright Program, the National Endowment of the Human-
ities, the French Government Teaching Assistantship program, 
and the Ministry of International Relations and Francophonie of 
the Government of Québec have all provided much- appreciated 
grants and fellowships. Collegial and intellectual reinforcement 
of the value of borderlands studies has come from fellow mem-
bers (and especially “chiefs”) of aborne, the African Borderlands 
Research Network. To round off the fi eldwork and kick- start 
the writing, I needed the encouragement and opportunity pro-
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vided by the Earhart Foundation, whose patience and support 
I acknowledge with much gratitude; thanks in particular go to 
Earhart Fellow Research Grant director Montgomery Brown. 
Without Earhart, there would be no book here.
Neither would there have been this book without the interest 
of the University of Nebraska Press and its anonymous review-
ers, who with invaluable suggestions for improvement, endorsed 
it. Editors Bridget Barry and Lona Dearmont worked tirelessly 
to improve the fl ow and prose of the manuscript: the remain-
ing defi ciencies remain mine alone.
In the course of my career’s research, many a Frenchman has 
inquired into my attraction to la Francophonie, French colo-
nialism, overseas France. My fascination with former French 
colonies has been a subconscious foil, perhaps, for my own coun-
try, culture, and history. After all, I tell my students, compara-
tive social science enables us to better see our own society and 
nation for what they are. “Does America not have its own his-
tory of colonialism? Is the United States not an imperial power 
today?” These challenges, put to me by (otherwise friendly) 
Frenchmen allergic to my incessant probing of their collective 
colonial heritage, have forced me to confront issues otherwise 
too close for comfort. “Comparing empires,” as Jonathan Hart 
(2003) puts it, “is at the same time an exercise in situating our 
own collective selves in imperial history.”
One French national in particular has been an indispensable 
spur to my lifelong quest for colonial and postcolonial knowl-
edge. Martinican by birth, ultimately American by choice, Loïza 
Nellec- Miles brought to our foyer prenuptial memories of colo-
nial and postcolonial life in Niger, Senegal, French Guiana, and 
Tahiti. The fruit of this love, Arielle Pooshpam and Samuel 
Benjamin, have already, through their own journeys, begun to 
enrich my understanding of the world. They, too, are part of the 
intriguing, unpredictable, and never- ending postcolonial story.
Buy the Book





Anglo- French Partition and Postcolonialism
[D]ecolonization is a harlot of a word. It pleases so many needs that readers 
can never be sure of its real meaning.
— Karl Hack, “Theories and Approaches to British Decolonization in 
Southeast Asia”
There are many related words invoked in scholarly settings that, 
following Hack, are easily prostituted: colonialism, exploitation, 
superpower, discourse, narrative. How neutral, how “objec-
tive” (itself a seductive concept), can one be in describing the 
operation and aftermath of conquest and overrule? For sure, 
ideological dispositions can color one’s use of such terms. But 
dueling meanings, I believe, stem less from bad faith than from 
academic discipline.
Postcolonial is the terminological bugaboo for this book. As a 
political scientist who borrows inordinately from history, geog-
raphy, and anthropology, I use the word “merely” to describe the 
social and political processes following the sovereignty exercised 
by European powers (here, British and French) over their Afri-
can, Asian, Latin American, and Oceanic colonies, protector-
ates, and territories. In this sense, postcolonialism is intimately 
related to decolonization (Hack’s semantic fl oozy).
This comparative inquiry into the long- term implications of 
French vis- à- vis British colonialism and decolonization, then, 
is primarily about identity— that of a large swath of humanity 
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who, through no choice of their own, fi nd themselves in territo-
ries recently under the dominion of France and Britain, the two 
major superpowers from the seventeenth until the mid- twentieth 
centuries. These colonial powers, moreover, with little regard 
for the peoples soon to be under their dominion, apportioned 
them to French or British tutelage. What difference, in the long 
run, has that arbitrary apportionment made?
What deep institutional legacies (regarding governance, devel-
opment, education, language policy, and religion) did French 
vis- à- vis British colonialism leave behind? What postcolonial 
commonalties link former French territories, and British ones, 
throughout the developing world? What accounts for the dis-
similarities that have arisen? At what junctures has culture 
begun to trump history?
To answer these questions with a pretense of scholarly “value 
added,” I yoke together four usually disparate clusters of lit-
erature.1 The fi rst is history: precolonial and colonial history, 
accounts of colonial explorers, diplomatic history, social his-
tory, histories of French and British imperial rule (and their 
respective types of administration), history of decolonization. 
For some of the cases, I had the opportunity to consult colo-
nial archival sources, and with others to undertake oral history 
of the late colonial era.
Geography is the second cluster of literature that I invoke. 
Colonial borders are notoriously arbitrary even if close his-
torical inspection uncovers some surprising contemporaneous 
concessions. Boundaries, those totems of political geography, 
condition the life prospects of the people born behind them and 
divided by them. Partition represents political geography at the 
edges of the state, giving birth to entirely new micro- societies: 
the borderlands. These political margins crystallize differences. 
“Borderline” should not be only an epithet (as in “borderline 
personality,” “marginal,” or “barely acceptable”), for it can 
reveal starkly different political realities. Anglo- French carv-
ing of colonial space is a signifi cant geographical legacy: nearly 
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40 percent of the entire length of today’s international bound-
aries were traced by Britain and France (Imbert- Vier 2011, 13, 
following Foucher 1991). Awareness of “where- ness” is critical 
to postcolonial understanding.
Thirdly, anthropology facilitates a focus on actual people 
and cultures. One of the common sins of both colonization and 
conventional histories of colonialism is reifi cation of the colo-
nized, including partitioned, peoples. For sure, great anticolo-
nial literature has emerged from such authors as Frantz Fanon, 
Albert Memmi, and Aimé Césaire, to cite but a few. But only 
anthropology investigates ordinary life for otherwise unher-
alded ethnic people and peoples, both during colonialism and 
after. My forays into and borrowings from anthropology logi-
cally focus on those indigenous peoples most directly affected, 
in the long- term, by colonial partition. By zooming in on oth-
erwise identical cultures that experienced French versus Brit-
ish colonialism, we can better discern the overarching effects 
of these two different systems on otherwise unrelated peoples. 
And we should gain a better appreciation of the import of this 
book’s theme upon “real people,” not just the erudite intellectu-
als whose writings are more widely known. I trust that whatever 
holes in my arguments professional historians of decoloniza-
tion may feel compelled to poke are compensated for by a bor-
derland sensitivity that conveys the contemporary perspectives 
of otherwise overlooked partitioned peoples.
As Emmanuel Brunet- Jailly (2005, 653) aptly observes, “each 
social science subfi eld has its own epistemology of borders.” 
The literature and methodology of these other disciplines may 
be somewhat remote to students of political science. But that is 
indeed my home discipline, ensuring that I retain an overarch-
ing concern for the political implications (local, national, interna-
tional) of my fi ndings. While acknowledging my debts to history, 
geography, and anthropology, this is a career- spanning exercise, 
above all, in comparative politics. Through the prism of the bor-
derlands, it refracts foundational precepts of the discipline so viv-
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idly expressed by fellow political scientist Crawford Young, as 
he refl ects on “territorial integrity and border sanctity”: “[T]he 
elixir of sovereignty hardened the map lines of the colonial parti-
tion into a permanent array of containers. . . . [T]he affi rmation 
of the colonial partition map even sharpened the territorial lines, 
now an iron grid of sovereign containers” (Young 2012, 90– 91, 
301). The present work advances a further assertion: Border-
lands do not negate sovereignty so much as they illuminate it.2
By focusing cross- culturally on ethnic groups partitioned 
by colonialism, this book fashions itself as the fi rst empirically 
grounded comparative study of the legacies of colonialism from 
the combined perspectives of political anthropology and political 
science. It thereby resolves a problem inherent in the literature 
thus far. To the macro- level surveys of Anglo- French colonialism 
and decolonization, it advances the role of indigenous cultures 
in shaping the outcome of colonial policies and their postcolo-
nial aftermaths. To the case studies that focus on ethnicity, it 
magnifi es the scope by a cross- cultural methodology, compar-
ing the overall impact of Anglo- French partitions in six differ-
ent world regions. In this light such otherwise universal concepts 
as, for example, Mbembe’s “postcolony” (1972) can be exam-
ined empirically, using the borderland as illuminating frame.
Why This Book— and Now?
Colonial legacies of the British and French— how archaic this 
phrase must sound to thinkers glued to the moment, how seem-
ingly removed from the “relevance” of today’s pressing politi-
cal issues! But not to all. In a review for Foreign Affairs (2007, 
148), Walter Russell Mead acknowledges the ongoing relevance 
of Anglo- French rivalry: “The interplay between these two soci-
eties has done more to shape the geopolitics, economics, and 
culture of the world today than the relationship between any 
other two societies on the face of the earth.” Four other impres-
sive books strengthen my conviction that I am indeed joining 
colleagues at the crossroads of critical postcolonial thought.
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The fi rst is Crawford Young’s most deservedly prizewinning 
The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (1994). 
In reassessing the colonialism of Africa in light of comparable 
histories elsewhere, Young— who trailblazed such studies with 
his 1976 classic Politics of Cultural Pluralism— makes a strong 
case for the uniqueness of African postcolonial outcomes.
In a remarkable, far- reaching chapter that foreshadows the 
aims of the present book, Young compares colonial and postco-
lonial Africa with North America and Australasia, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, Micronesia and Korea, Malaysia and Fiji, 
Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, Indochina, 
Oceania, India, the Philippines, and the Middle East. From his 
cross- national colonial comparisons, Professor Young identifi es 
a “singular historical personality” for Africa vis- à- vis these other 
regions, characterized by a “singularly diffi cult legacy bequeathed 
by the institutions of rule devised to establish and maintain alien 
hegemony.” While sensitive to French- British colonial differences, 
he does not make them his overarching framework. As I intend 
to demonstrate, a comparative perspective that does use this lens 
tempers the “singular” nature of Africa in favor of a global anal-
ysis that continues to privilege, for explanatory purposes, the leg-
acies of distinct modalities of European colonialism.
My efforts to understand the ways in which indigenous societ-
ies and former colonies throughout the developing world continue 
to refl ect their respective colonial antecedents echoes Young’s 
pioneering work. So do my more focused attempts to perceive 
the distinctive French and British stamps that continue to mark 
daily life for ordinary people along and behind superimposed 
boundaries throughout the so- called Third World.
A second signal work in comparative colonialism and decol-
onization also takes the end of the Soviet Union as its spring-
board The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in 
Comparative Perspective, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott (1997). Several chapters focus on the British and French 
experiences as potential previews for what the close of the Soviet 
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era may portend. In it, British and French colonial and postco-
lonial experiences fi gure prominently. For example, Michael Fry 
frames British and French decolonization as a Cold War expe-
rience that indirectly pitted the Soviet Union against the United 
States. Compared with the demise of the Soviet empire, Fry 
maintains, it unfolded in a premeditated and orderly manner.
In a subsequent, equally important edited volume Beyond 
State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post- Soviet Eurasia in 
Comparative Perspective, Professor Young teams up with Soviet 
specialist Mark Beissinger to edit a cutting- edge work that again 
reassesses the contemporary applications of African colonial his-
tory. Shared syndromes— state breakdown and violence, eco-
nomic collapse, ethnic and gender vulnerability— are identifi ed 
as rooted in colonial and communist institutional patterns. 
Although tangential to their overarching thesis, Beissinger and 
Young also point out another shared legacy that is essential to 
our approach here: the porousness of boundaries, which refl ects 
both their arbitrary origins and (many) states’ inability to exer-
cise meaningful control over them.
A key contribution of Beissinger and Young’s volume lies in its 
cross- regional (as opposed to case- specifi c) approach. “The issues 
that grip Africa and post- Soviet Eurasia transcend region; they 
are global in scope” (Beissinger and Young 2002, 5). In like man-
ner, many of my fi ndings in areas where former French colonies 
butt up against former British ones (e.g., smuggling, human traf-
fi cking) certainly exist elsewhere, and are no less important for it.
William Easterly’s critique of Western aid to the developing 
world, The White Man’s Burden, might not at fi rst blush seem 
relevant to a reconsideration of colonialism. Yet Easterly sees a 
direct relationship between the failures of today’s humanitari-
anism and yesterday’s imperialism. “The West sowed . . . may-
hem with chaotic decolonization,” writes Easterly in his chapter 
“From Colonialism to Postmodern Imperialism,” “especially the 
arbitrary way the West drew borders.” Part of the white man’s 
burden, as he recasts Kipling’s formulation, is the economic diffi -
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culty of repairing societies rent asunder by partition, even though 
“many will deny the relevance of colonial experience to today’s 
allegedly more humanitarian exercises” (Easterly 2006, 272).
Easterly statistically examines the relationship between eth-
nic partition and economic development. Although he does not 
distinguish between French and British territories, he fi nds that 
globally, former colonies containing signifi cant proportions 
of partitioned peoples perform relatively poorly in delivery of 
government services (health and education), transparency, and 
rule of law.
Taking literally the image of the colonial bureaucrat who, 
oblivious to ethnic reality on a faraway continent, draws a 
straight line on a map, Easterly even quantifi ed boundaries 
according to their linearity or jaggedness. His intriguing fi nd-
ing: “artifi cially straight borders were statistically associated 
with less democracy, higher infant mortality, more illiteracy, 
less childhood immunization, and less access to clean water” 
(2006, 293) (see Fig. 1).
 Fig. 1. Democracy and Partition in Former Colonies
From The White Man’s Burden by William Easterly, copyright 
© 2006 by William Easterly.
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It is mostly in departments of language, literature, and cul-
tural studies that postcolonial has become an institutional-
ized framework for analysis. There it is indissolubly wedded to 
deconstructionism and other literary devices I do not negotiate 
comfortably. The concept that dominates (paradoxically, given 
that postcolonialism postulates antidomination) is hybridiza-
tion, the mixing or blending of cultures previously thought of 
as colonized and colonizing. Such a postcultural perspective is 
particularly suspicious of language as an oppressive vehicle that 
imposes a “master narrative.”
The fi rst journal to professionalize this paradigm, postcoLo-
niaL studies, began publishing in 1998; another manifestation 
is pursued by members of the Society for Francophone Postco-
lonial Studies, whose journal Francophone Postcolonial Stud-
ies fi rst appeared in 2003. Truth in academic advertising: I do 
not situate my study of Anglo- French postcolonialism within 
that framework of analysis. This work, deliberately, is a non- 
Foucaultian social scientist’s take on the postcolonial.3 It intends 
to demonstrate that the distinctive stamps of France and Britain 
continue to mark daily life for ordinary people along and behind 
superimposed boundaries throughout the so- called Third World.
Professional historians might well disagree with this stance. 
With the passage of time, and the proliferation of the archival 
and other microlevel dissertation, there has been a tendency to 
cut away the forest of generality for the trees of specifi city. Some 
have come to question the very validity of a stark difference 
between French direct and British indirect rule (Dulucq, Klein, 
and Stora 2008, 24). The debate is far from over, though, and in 
any event, it ought to shift location from archives to borderlands.
Framing Hypothesis
Although spurred by similar motives of national interest (for-
eign markets, mercantilism, competitive nationalism), Britain 
and France placed different emphases on the desired outcomes 
among their colonized subjects: technical competence for the 
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former, cultural appropriation (even amour propre) for the lat-
ter. “Colonialism was as much a state of mind as it was a set 
of coercive practices and system of resource extraction,” notes 
Alice Conklin (1997, 248), and the French state of mind was 
substantially different from the British.
Despite their formal sovereign status, former French and Brit-
ish colonies— which together encompass more than one- third of 
the world’s territory— still bear the underlying imprint of their 
colonial pasts. Unlike the pragmatic and mercantilistic Brit-
ish, in their own colonial enterprise the French pursued much 
more culturally transformative aims. Even with respect to the 
pre- 1789 First Colonial Empire holdings in North America, the 
Caribbean, and Indian Ocean, a “fusion of imagined admin-
istrative responsibility with proclaimed revolutionary purpose 
was the foundation of French colonial ideology” (Betts 1991, 
17). This fundamental difference— embodied in the phrases 
assimiliation and mission civilisatrice— still assumes signifi -
cant, if underappreciated, import throughout the Third World 
today. Whereas successor regimes to the British crown have used 
their juridical independence to pursue a wide array of postco-
lonial structures and policies, polities and nations decolonized 
by the French Republic have retained a comparatively formal-
istic, top- down, and centralized approach to governance and 
state- society relations.
This dichotomy holds despite basic differences in culture, 
geography, and political systems. And as long as it does, the 
process of decolonization, as opposed to formal independence, 
remains incomplete. But before testing this initial hypothesis on 
the ground, we need to acknowledge what specialists of colo-
nial history have to say.4
Although covering a broad swath of time and territory— from 
the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, from the New World 
to the Golden Triangle— the literature agrees that at least on 
paper, British and French policy makers marked their colonial 
ambitions and actions with distinctive national stamps. Both 
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powers viewed colonies as requisites for grandeur and sources 
of natural and human resources. Both approached their colo-
nized from a position of cultural (if not racial) superiority, plac-
ing greater hopes (and making more sacrifi ces) in settler colonies 
(e.g., Kenya, Algeria) than in ones without European settlers. 
Over time, often in response to external events, both powers 
did shift their offi cial implementation strategies. But overall, 
whereas the French offi cially assumed the additional obligation 
of transforming the colonized into likenesses of France, with 
an eventual promise of égalité, the British rarely, if ever, har-
bored equivalent illusions of assimilating the colonized into their 
national bosom. (To take this metaphor literally, contrast the 
iconic symbol of the bare- breasted French revolutionary Mar-
ianne with staid British photos of the Queen; both can still be 
found in diplomatic outposts throughout the postcolonial world.)
The major point of colonial historicist contention is this: on 
the ground, did colonial policy matter? Beyond grandiose pro-
nouncements emanating from London and Paris (or even Delhi 
and Dakar), in the fi nal analysis, did it make a difference to the 
colonized? Did lower- level French and British colonial adminis-
trators actually implement the policies that supposedly distin-
guished each from the other? Did partitioned peoples experience 
colonialism in substantially different ways? Only if the answer 
is yes will we fi nd separate legacies that continue to condition 
life and politics in the former colonies.
Hack, quoted at the chapter head, discusses the “software of 
colonialism: books, languages, customs, judicial systems, social 
structures, attitudes” (Hack 2003, 119). However, as with the 
digital age, in which there is no uncontested electronic hegemon, 
so with colonialism. At the risk of anachronistic analogy, we 
may suggest that colonial Britain may have been from Micro-
soft, but colonial France hailed from rival Apple. Though part 
of the same overarching and inescapable network, their succes-
sor states continue to fi lter and process the world through dif-
ferent operating systems.
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Although Africa did not experience the earliest or longest- 
lasting colonialisms, it is in this continental context that the 
scholarly debate has been most extensive. Perhaps it is because 
of the legacy of Lord Frederick Lugard, who, notwithstanding 
his distinguished service in India, is remembered for formulating 
the doctrine of Indirect Rule as the “model” of British coloniza-
tion in Northern Nigeria. From the heyday of colonialism in the 
1920s until the wave of independence in the 1960s, the debate 
over Direct versus Indirect Rule dominated colonial discourse.
Since the 1970s the colonial postmortem has pitted advocates 
of the “similarity” versus those of the “difference” schools of 
Anglo- French colonialism in Africa. The former deny the over-
all signifi cance, as it affected on- the- ground decisions and out-
comes, of supposed differences in French and British colonial 
policies: colonialism was colonialism, a mere episode in the 
longer evolution of African history. When the similarity school 
measures the overall impact of French association, a compen-
satory colonial policy in the interwar years designed, in direct 
contrast with assimilation, to soften the starkly imperial and 
chauvinistic implications of Direct Rule, it fi nds it wanting.5
Prospects for decolonization refl ected these differential path-
ways. Whereas the English could conceive of a trust, granting 
autonomy and eventual independence, the French could not 
(Betts 1991, 17). This is why, invoking Todd Shepard’s (2006) 
felicitous phrase, France had such a hard time “inventing decol-
onization.” Even France eventually had to bend to anti- imperial 
reality, with Algeria and Vietnam providing the most painful 
spurs. Still, as Shepard shows in the Algerian case, France not 
only resisted to the bitter end the political inevitability of a 
breakup, but psychologically resisted it beyond.
Achille Mbembe’s provocative analysis of the African “post-
colony” does not engage the Anglo- French colonial debate explic-
itly, but by seamlessly offering examples of abusive, excessive, 
and fetishist power from Kenya (formerly British), Togo (for-
merly French), and Cameroon (formerly French and British), he 
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implicitly embraces the similarity school of postcolonial inher-
itance. In positing that “decentralized despotism” best charac-
terizes the continuity between late colonialism and postcolonial 
administration, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) also implicitly 
downgrades the continuity of distinctive European infl uences 
in France’s and Britain’s former colonies. Longtime specialist 
of French colonial policy Raymond Betts seems to be of two 
minds on the question.6
Defenders of the difference school accept the traditional under-
standing of French- British colonial distinctions (à la Oliver and 
Atmore 1972, and Gann and Duigan 1969) and maintain its 
overall explanatory relevance for African successor states. Adu 
Boahen (1987) lends great authority (if debatable details) to their 
position.7 Widner (1994) has demonstrated differences, based 
on colonial provenance, in the likelihood of sustained compe-
tition within newly democratizing political systems. Dimier 
(2002, 2004) plumbs the respective national interests of those 
who posed the question of colonial differentiation in the fi rst 
place. At the level of high diplomacy, contrast the Common-
wealth— an older club of independent states over which Britain 
exercises desultory control— with La Francophonie, in which 
France is still very much in the driver’s seat.8
But how have ordinary denizens of the Third World expe-
rienced the aftermath of colonialism? Does having been colo-
nized by France rather than Britain still make a difference to 
them? An economist might very well conclude that on aver-
age, former British colonies perform better than French ones in 
growth and development (Grier 1997), and that a more popu-
list pedagogy (as promoted by colonial Britain) is in large mea-
sure responsible (Grier 1999). That does not, however, settle the 
score, especially for indigenous peoples who, fi nding themselves 
on opposite sides of artifi cial boundaries drawn by alien pow-
ers, were differentially colonized. There is more at stake than 
aggregate gdp for national societies: there is also cultural integ-
rity, and national treatment, in postcolonial society.
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The continuing relevance of the colonial paradigm is more 
a matter of perspective than a question of empiricism. At the 
macro level of change, a focus on freedom or underdevelopment 
or globalization may well overshadow distinctions between 
inherited French and British structures and mentalities of colo-
nialism. But with respect to middle- level change— say, educa-
tional structures or traditional rulership or church/mosque- state 
relations— the differences still outweigh the similarities. In any 
event, the relevance and repercussions of the debate far tran-
scend the shores of Africa and remain open, despite claims by 
some that the similarity school has triumphed. It is at the grass-
roots in the borderlands, I hope to show, that the national dif-
ferences in colonialism have changed lives most dramatically.
Problems of Partition
Partition takes different forms. Most common is proximate ter-
ritorial: either a recognizable river (as in the case of the Mekong, 
chosen to divide Laos from Burma) or a geometric line (drawn 
through the Sahelian sand to separate Nigeria from Niger). 
But maritime demarcations also partition. Think of the islands 
of the French West Indies cordoned off from the British West 
Indies. In the Indian Ocean and South Pacifi c, colonial parti-
tion has been less territorial than ethnic and psychological: in 
Mauritius, British supercession of French sovereignty (dichro-
nous partition) led to institutionalized differences on the same 
island on the basis of race; in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), con-
docolonialism9 mentally partitioned islanders not on the basis 
of territory, but with respect to perceived Anglophone and Fran-
cophone varieties of religion (synchronous partition).
Those readers more used to the conventional, territorial use of 
partition and borders may be bothered by those cases in which I 
use the terms in less than literal ways. Rest assured that bound-
ary and borderland specialists have been incorporating simi-
larly metaphorical applications for some time. Moreover, even 
for those two cases that I do characterize as experiencing “lines 
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in the mind”— Mauritius and Vanuatu— a more conventional 
(albeit maritime) colonial partition also persists. Thus, I shall 
contrast postcolonial Mauritius with its neighboring overseas 
French department of Réunion. Similarly, Vanuatu begs con-
trast with nearby New Caledonia, which also remains part of 
the French Republic. Beyond those familiar maritime demarca-
tions, I still contend that undergoing British rule after French 
colonialism in Mauritius, and dealing with dueling colonialisms 
in Vanuatu, are the more interesting confi gurations of partition 
in those two island nations.
Even more than in the realm of science fi ction, it may be in 
the colonial and postcolonial worlds that space becomes the 
fi nal frontier. Colonialism entailed “respatialization,” not only 
with respect to border lines and land use but also in deeper per-
ceptions of place for the colonized. “In reworking the physical 
space of the territories into which they moved so as to ensure 
and justify their own domination . . . the Europeans forced dras-
tic changes in the local geography of the mind” (Betts 2004, 
90). Colonialism forced indigenous denizens to invest old places 
with new meanings: thus do sociologists’ and geographers’ for-
mulation of social space fi nd pertinent application in colonial 
and postcolonial situations.
Touching points for otherwise identical colonially separated 
cultures particularly excite me. It is on the periphery, on the 
margins of the postcolonial state— often denigrated in the term 
“borderline”— that one most clearly captures the long- term leg-
acies of colonialism.10 Rarely have I encountered confi rmation of 
the conventional wisdom that borderlanders “ignore” the arti-
fi cial colonial boundaries that divide them “only on paper.”11 
Even where the border itself is invisible, I have been repeatedly 
impressed by the extent to which denizens of frontiers do assim-
ilate and therefore legitimate the reality of state differences as 
inherited from the colonial era.12
Ethnic partition is not always a surgical cut of a spatially 
homogenous group, as with the Hausa of West Africa or the 
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Tamils of South India. In the case of Southeast Asia, I examine 
as “partitioned” into Laos and Burma (1) minority hill tribes that 
were already dispersed, with little preexisting territorial contigu-
ity, and (2) contiguous lowlanders, who had a very loose sense 
of unity to begin with. Among some of these peoples, colonial 
partition immediately set into motion changes that affected the 
peoples so divided; among others, it merely planted the seeds 
for wider- reaching dynamics that have been accentuated in the 
postcolonial eras. In the West Indies and the South Pacifi c, I 
maintain that ethnic partition also is at work when peoples are 
divided not only by geometric cuts of line but by expanses of 
water: archipelagic societies were partitioned, too. And in the 
case of the Indian Ocean (Réunion, Seychelles, and Mauritius) 
we focus on one society, Mauritius, whose colonial partition 
was not spatial but temporal: a century of French colonial rule 
followed by a century and a half of British colonialism.
For comparative social scientists specializing either in former 
British or former French colonies in the developing world, the 
framework pursued here illuminates embedded structural con-
straints that continue to affect the direction and pace of devel-
opment. By examining legacies of comparative colonialism from 
the bottom up, and paying particular attention to the mediat-
ing forces of local culture, a much more nuanced understand-
ing of contemporary state and society in the former colonies 
of Britain and France emerges. For different cultures react to 
colonialism differently.
Borderlands crystallize the differences between the former 
colonies; that is why I use them as my methodological frame, 
despite the common criticism that I encounter, that border regions 
are by defi nition peculiar, peripheral, atypical, and otherwise 
unrepresentative. “Study the heartland, the urban centers, the 
capital,” I am advised. “That is where the essence of a nation 
lies.” Undoubtedly, borderlands are special, but it is precisely 
the extent to which they nevertheless do refl ect their respective 
states, formally and informally, that they are instructive. One 
Buy the Book
16 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
can also keep variables more constant between indigenes of the 
Mekong River than between the populations of Yangon/Ran-
goon and Vientiane, or in the case of Hausaland, between the 
denizens of Abuja and Niamey. Two broad questions undergird 
the inquiry: How did discrete indigenous groups (e.g., Mela-
nesian, Hausa, Tamil, Lao) respond, subvert, and adjust to the 
respective British and French colonial projects superimposed 
onto their society and culture? In what ways (political, linguis-
tic, economic) have their emergent postcolonial states differed 
as a consequence of their previous colonial imprints?
“A retrospective examination,” writes Crawford Young within 
the context of the colonial state in Africa, “can illuminate some 
of the frailties of its postcolonial successor and perhaps even 
suggest avenues of escape from its more burdensome legacies” 
(Young 1994, 9). The following chapters aim to advance Pro-
fessor Young’s laudable goal by harnessing other regions’ expe-
rience in comparative colonialism and decolonization. Chief 
among the “burdensome legacies,” as we shall see, is the post-
colonial inheritance of the artifi cial, superimposed boundary.
Plan of Book
After briefl y examining several West African peoples separated 
by adjoining British- French colonial divisions, the second chap-
ter focuses on the Hausa (Africa’s largest ethnic group), divided 
into Niger and Nigeria. Distinctive colonial policies combined 
with characteristics of Hausa society created distinct national 
versions of ethnic identity. Mostly (but not completely) arbitrary 
territorial divisions— the classic “line in the sand”— marked the 
partition of West Africa into (mostly) British and French colonies.
Why do slave descendants in the French Antilles today expe-
rience a very different reality than do their counterparts in 
nearby Anglophone islands? This is the underlying question in 
chapter 3. Prior to the partitions outlined in chapter 2, Euro-
peans were already subjecting Africans to distinct versions of 
imperial sovereignty: slavery scattered Africans to dozens of 
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West Indian islands controlled by Britain and France. In the 
Caribbean, France still practices decolonization without inde-
pendence. Slave- based colonialism bequeathed fewer options 
for postcolonial transformation than in colonial lands of eth-
nically indigenous populations.
Chapter 4 shifts the paradigm to another partitioned ocean, 
the Pacifi c. As in the West Indies, the South Pacifi c was also 
arbitrarily parceled into French and British colonial zones. Here, 
however, entire clusters of islands were ruled under single admin-
istrations. In one such archipelago, the New Hebrides, France 
and Britain agreed to share sovereignty by establishing a con-
dominium. Indigenous Melanesians responded by a policy of 
“divide though conquered.” After independence, the archipel-
ago nation of Vanuatu used language and reinvented custom to 
transcend inherited colonial divisions. How well has this strat-
egy worked beyond Melanesia?
Whereas Vanuatu experienced concurrent colonialism, in 
the Indian Ocean (chapter 5) the islanders of Mauritius under-
went consecutive colonialism: French, followed by British. So 
why does Francophone culture remain stronger than the one 
bequeathed by Britain? Lacking most of the usual preconditions 
for democracies— including national unity— Mauritius embraces 
its dual colonial heritage for the purposes of managing ethnic 
confl ict and promoting development. No wonder the litera-
ture abounds with Mauritius as a “model.” I maintain that an 
overlooked dimension to Mauritius’s success lies in the hybridic 
nature of its colonial heritage, layered by South Asian immi-
gration. The ancestral homeland of most Mauritians is India, 
where France remained longer than did Britain. So in chapter 
5 I also examine how the Francophone Indians of Pondichéry 
compare, especially in their political culture, to their migrant 
counterparts in Mauritius. While the anomaly of French India 
could have been treated in a separate chapter— it is, after all a 
distinct case of Anglo- French rivalry with unique postcolonial 
outcomes— the commonality of French colonial infl uence over 
Buy the Book
18 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
ethnic Indians, be it in the Dravidian heartland or Mauritian 
diaspora— provides an intriguing frame for parallel treatment.
Chapter 6 discusses how, in all of Southeast Asia, there is 
only one border that separates a former French colony from a 
former British one: the 150 miles of the Upper Mekong separat-
ing Laos from Burma (Myanmar). Dividing the Mekong River 
into Lao and Burmese territories affected two geocultural cat-
egories of indigenous peoples: those whose territory actually 
straddles the riverine boundary and those who inhabit noncon-
tiguous communities on both sides of the international border. 
Postcolonial revolution greatly disturbed these spatial patterns, 
however, introducing a new variable into the comparative colo-
nialism paradigm. In order to persist, colonial legacies require 
a critical threshold of political stability.
Until the concluding chapter, colonial policies are framed 
against indigenous group response patterns. In the concluding 
chapter, I revisit general questions of ethnicity, history, and vari-
ability in colonial policy; the overall diversity in types of post-
colonial regimes and patterns of response to them; overarching 
regional and geocultural extrapolations; broad differentiations 
in material and political outcomes; long- term implications for 
languages (offi cial and indigenous); and the possibility of an 
overarching borderland message. Despite these generalizing 
frameworks, my greater plea is for more empiricism within post-
colonial studies, currently an overtheorized, highly abstract, fi eld.
When I began this project, I had hoped to personalize a 
Rawlsian- type hypothetical: “If you did not know in advance 
into which culture or region of the world you would be born, 
but could choose between a former French or British colony, 
which would you choose?” Although some have used statistical 
models to approximate this scenario (is it a postcolonial “pris-
oner’s dilemma”?), I realize now that the question presents a 
false choice. Contingencies— cultural, historical, strategic— are 
too multistranded to reduce the Anglo- French colonial grid into 
Buy the Book
ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION | 19
a single outcome, life choice, or number.13 More important is 
the freedom to choose one’s culture and society after achiev-
ing political consciousness.
Comparison is also complicated by time, both historical and 
fi eldwork related. Temporal proximity to events of research focus 
certainly skews some cross- national generalization. On one end 
of the scale, thirty- fi ve years had already lapsed between the 
juncture when the French West Indies opted to become départe-
ments of France (1946) and my fi rst visit there. At the other end 
of the scale, a mere eleven years separated the independence of 
Vanuatu (1980) from my major block of South Pacifi c research.14 
So recent, so fresh was the demarcation between the colonial era 
and the postcolonial one that the transition still seemed fl uid and 
the research in Vanuatu all the touchier. As time passes, some 
variables tend to lose their salience as others come to replace 
them. The long- term signifi cance in British versus French pol-
icies of colonization is a case in point. As colonialism became 
supplanted by the Cold War and then globalization, the Euro-
pean distinction has lost much currency as an explanatory fac-
tor for postcolonial developments. My contention— tempered 
by the acknowledgment that decades separate the time from 
decolonization and my research in some polities as opposed to 
others— is that the Anglo- French distinction still matters a lot 
more to partitioned borderlanders than to students of postco-
lonial history.
That said, the legacies of Anglo- French partition live on in a 
wide array of arenas, for larger swaths of the population, in are-
nas I identifi ed above: language, education, governance, religion, 
and so on. Francophonie remains a societal reference in former 
French colonies in a more penetrating way than “Anglophony” 
is in former British colonies. I am referring here not only to lan-
guage use but to conceptualization and institutionalism. Both 
forms of colonization were transformative, for sure: in the long 
run, though, the French legacies are more constant and iden-
tifi able than the British ones. This argument holds only in the 
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strictly comparative sense: by holding constant for similar eth-
nic groups who experienced both forms of colonialism.
In offering this global dichotomy of French and British colo-
nialism and its aftermath, I hope the reader will join me in bet-
ter appreciating the singularity of his or her own historicized 
life story. For, in our own way, are we not all postcolonials?
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